

National Security, Grand Strategy, and America's Role in the 21st Century: Strengthening Global Partnership

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INTRODUCTION

The underlying theme of my United States grand strategy doctrine takes a classical liberal approach that focuses on the development of collective security and multilateralism for confronting America's challenges and opportunities in the 21st century. My analysis begins with an overview of what has been labeled as the "New World Order," looking at the collapse of the Soviet Union and the harrowing memory of September 11th, as a point of departure. Understanding the historical and political context of the "new world" is important for two reasons. First the international system has experienced a dramatic evolution, and the global state of affairs is defined by a new paradigm influenced by terrorism, challenges to the nation state and national sovereignty, and globalization. Secondly, there has been a political debate in U.S. foreign policy whether the post-Cold War era represents a "unipolar" moment versus a "multipolar" worldview. These two divergent approaches to grand strategy and national security have substantial policy consequences. The subsequent sections outline my national security vision with an emphasis on three dominant themes: collective security and international cooperation, economic policy, and the nexus of domestic and international politics. My analysis concludes by addressing

some specific challenges, threats, and opportunities that confront foreign policy in the 21st century such as, state-building and aggrandizing transatlantic rapport. I feel these two issues touch the essence of a myriad of challenges whereby economic development and international rapprochement lend themselves to long-term peace and stability and mitigate the threat of terrorism.

DEFINING THE "NEW WORLD ORDER"

The collapse of the Soviet empire in 1990-91 signaled the end of "bipolarity," the ideological and military conflict between the American and Soviet superpowers, and thus represented a radical departure from a Cold War grand strategy approach based on containment to one with global ramifications and reach. The post-Cold War era presented a period of enormous challenge and opportunity. The transformation of the international system originally generated a foreign policy debate among two camps, one who believed that the end of the Cold War represented a "unipolar" moment vis-à-vis a second group who envisioned the international system in the long term as an emerging "multipolar" world. Within this context, these two contradicting assumptions greatly influence the way one

confronts U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy today.

The “unipolar” camp believed that there was a single superpower, the United States. Primacy doctrine and Hegemonic Stability Theory are two of the dominant theses that evoke unilateral principles. Hegemonic Stability Theory postulates that in order for the world to be stable, there needs to be a world hegemon, a lender of last resort and provider of public goods and stability (Gilpin 144-145). Primacy doctrine elaborates on this concept and posits that the dominant power can impose its will in any way it wants. Thinkers of the “unipolar” camp looked toward the Roman and British empires as antecedents.

The “unipolar” thesis was challenged by the “multipolar” camp who believed there were many “polarity” poles that consisted of the United States, Europe, China, Russia, Japan, and India. The period between Westphalia (1648) and World War I is an example of a “multipolar” historical-political context. Following the assumption that there is a more intricate distribution of power in the international system where two or more actors exhibit significant military, economic, and political clout, it gives credence to the importance of partnership and coalition building. The “unipolar” and “multipolar” camps illustrate two contending questions of the post-Cold War period: 1) the issue of countervailing coalitions juxtaposed with 2) an imperial minded policy. In the modern context, these two divergent approaches and their policy consequences are tantamount to the Clinton and George W. Bush national security strategies. The post-Cold War context is a point of departure for United States grand strategy in the twenty-first century (Kiracofe, “American Foreign Policy”).

I believe Kupchan aptly depicts the United States’ role as hegemon in the context of determining polarity. He argues that although the current configuration of power

is unipolar, as realists claim, American primacy is waning and that the United States’s continued role in the international system means engaging in collective security and adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy (Kupchan 53-54). If we accept the plausibility of Kupchan’s argument, then we must first prove that there are in fact states in the international system with enough capabilities to singularly influence world events, and that some type of power balancing is occurring. I believe this is undoubtedly true. It would be dangerous to suppose that U.S. hegemony can endure indefinitely. Christopher Layne offers a compelling argument against Primacy doctrine. He explains that primacists unwittingly conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States since no new great powers have emerged that have engaged in “hard,” or military balancing. To be sure, second-tier states have challenged the United States through non-traditional forms of balancing such as, “soft-power” balancing, “economic pre-balancing,” and “leash-slipping.” The projection of “soft-power,” relies on non-military means of power such as, diplomacy, international institutions, and international law. “Economic pre-balancing” aims at closing the economic and technological gap, ultimately laying the foundation for hard-balancing in the future. Lastly “leash-slipping” is the strengthening of military capabilities to promote independent foreign policy (Layne 8-9).

One poignant example of counterbalancing is the rise of Europe. Europe seeks to project its collective power and geopolitical ambition through the European Union. It is an example of anti-U.S. “leash-slipping” since the EU includes a common security policy supported by independent military capabilities. For example, in 1999, the EU asserted its military independence by adopting the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In

2000 the EU established a 60,000-man rapid reaction force, essentially forming the beginning of a EU army, separate from NATO (Layne 34-35). The EU also engages in “economic pre-balancing.” The foundation and one of the pillars of the EU is the European Community, the basis for the EU’s economic and monetary union, established by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (“Gateway to the European Union”). Fifteen countries currently use the Euro as a single currency, which is fundamental to the EU’s goal of establishing a single market economy (“Gateway”).¹ In 2007, the EU had a nominal GDP of \$16.6 trillion, amounting to 31% of the world’s total economic output (“International Monetary Fund”).² These factors in mind, the European Union can be considered a counter-pole to the United States

Scholars defending the “multipolar” thesis argue that the international system is evolving and has experienced a “rapid state of transition.”³ In his report, *An Agenda for Peace*, former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali raises a meaningful dialogue about global leadership in international affairs. He states:

History is accelerating. The pace is alarming. The direction is not entirely known. At this time of stress, the hard fact is that no power or combination of powers is prepared to take on its shoulders the responsibility for collective security worldwide. (Lauren 111)

Although his remarks deal with the burgeoning issue of international security and stability, it raises a contentious debate among political scientists. For example, in *The Case for Goliath*, Michael Mandelbaum contradicts this argument on the premise that the United States *is* the world’s “goliath,” and avows that the U.S. *should* govern the world. Mandelbaum believes that as

hegemon, the United States is responsible for providing public goods to the international community. If no one provides those goods, then they go underprovided. According to Hegemonic Stability Theory, a hegemon provides four essential goods and services: 1) financial stability as a lender of last resort, 2) a large economic market, 3) commercial liquidity and the flow of money, and 4) exchange rate stability (Gilpin 144-145).

The contrast between the ideas of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Mandelbaum articulate the debate between the “unipolar” and “multipolar” camps; however, the aspect of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s observation that resonates the most is the word “prepared.” Whereas Mandelbaum interprets “prepared” as “willing and able,” Boutros Boutros-Ghali considers whether the ability of one country to provide peace and stability is sustainable in the long run. In *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Paul Kennedy warns us about the dangers of “imperial overstretch.” He argues that a country that tries to be hegemonic faces phenomenal economic costs, and normally those costs outweigh the benefits of imperialism. Historical examples of this trend include Spain under the rule of Charles V and Philip II (Mandelbaum 28).

Although I do not mean to overstate the liberal aspects of Hegemonic Stability Theory as doctrine, I believe a natural response to the argument’s premise logically segues into a liberal solution. More important than the creation of public goods is the creation of institutions that outlive the life of the hegemon. Today, the United States should use its power and influence, like it did after World War II, to create a liberal international order. An important caveat, however, is that the hegemon must not only be able, but willing. After World War I, the United States was arguably the most powerful country in the world. We had a preponderance of resources, raw material control, a comparative advantage in

capital, and a large market; however, the United States did not take on the mantle of hegemony. Secondly, the primacist conception of hegemon is palliated by the United States' image as "benevolent hegemon." "American hegemony is reluctant, open, and highly institutionalized-or, in a word, liberal. This is what makes it acceptable to other countries that might otherwise be expected to balance against hegemonic power, and it is also what makes it stable and expansive," says Ikenberry (77). By exercising our preponderance of power with constraint for the common-good and directing our energies through multilateral institutions, United States hegemony comports itself into a liberal, democratic vision (Layne 16). Realist theories can explain the rise of the hegemon, but liberal theories show the role institutions can make.

Another predominant feature of the 21st century is the gradual erosion of national sovereignty and new security challenges faced by the traditional concept of the nation state. Following the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that established the modern state system and the rise of the "Great Powers" of the seventeenth century, states have been perceived as unitary actors in international relations and the only entity capable of threatening the security of others. German political scientist, Max Weber, defined the state as having a "monopoly on the legitimate use of power." The extent to which Weber's statement holds true today has been undermined by the emergence of non-traditional security challenges. They include globalization, technological change, the rise of militarism and revolution of military affairs (RMA), public diplomacy, and "new security threats" such as ethnicity, weak states, terrorism, transnational criminal organizations, nuclear proliferation and "weapons of mass destruction." By themselves, each factor represents a discrete security challenge to the United States; however, these challenges also feed off of

each other where "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" (Hentz, "Shaping").

ARTICULATING A GRAND VISION STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS

In his treatise *Strategy*, Sir B. H. Liddell Hart explains that the role of grand strategy is to "coordinate and direct all of the resources of the nation or a band of nations towards the attainment of the political object of war" (Hentz viii). Traditionally, the five instruments of national security policy include political, diplomatic, military, economic, and psychological policy tools (Kiracofe, "Lecture"). Public diplomacy, the idea that society is a political base and center of gravity, is arguably another important component that is uniquely relevant to contemporary affairs because of the transformative role of the media and access to real time information (Lauren 114-115). Secondly, there are two dimensions of national security. The first goal is protecting our shores and vital national interests, and the second dimension seeks to protect and project American culture and exceptionalism. These two goals are entirely contradictory, the first of which is narrow and constricted in aim, and the second which is broad in nature. Attaining these two goals simultaneously requires a great degree of creativity and an acute awareness of one's national interests and shared priorities in the international system (Hentz, "National Security").

To create an effective grand strategy it is necessary to determine the right mix of policy tools in order to secure national interests and contain one's enemy. Thus, grand strategy is on one hand opportunistic and on the other an instrument of national defense. I believe the best strategy is probabilistic and threat-based, meaning that a state empirically assesses the "probability of aggression" and acts consistent to the

threat (Brooks 446). Secondly, a state should pursue long-term political objectives through economic, political, and diplomatic measures first with an adequate military means. I believe it is entirely possible for states to pursue economic capacity over military preparedness where the benefits exceed the potential security loss. The decision of developing countries to participate in cooperative efforts is demonstrated by Latin American common markets such as, the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) and the Central American Common Market (CACM) (Brooks 467). Sun Tzu addresses this approach nicely when he says, “The greatest victory is the one you achieve without firing a shot.” A grand strategy should be parsimonious, meaning that it is relatively simple, adaptable, and flexible, and lastly, means must be commensurate with purpose and purpose within its means. Grand strategy should reflect the “art of the possible.”

a. Partnership and Cooperation

Given the challenges that confront the nation state, the effects of globalization, and new security challenges, it is paramount that United States grand strategy in the 21st century, seeks collective security through a global concert of powers, partnership, and coalition building. The backbone of stability is manifested in international institutions and economic markets. In *The Obligation of Empire*, Charles Kupchan, a proponent of multilateralism, argues that United States hegemony is waning and predicts power will eventually diffuse among emerging regional powers causing the eclipse of the “unipolar moment.” Furthermore, he argues that the United States should take advantage of this “window of opportunity,” to strategically distribute power to regional actors through collective security policy (Kupchan 53-54). Kupchan defines the role of collective security as the following:

Collective security means reliance on great-power cooperation to manage the global system. It means making room for newcomers so that they array their rising power with rather than against the United States. And it means reliance on international institutions to bind major powers to each other and to bound their behavior through adherence to common norms. (65)

An international consensus among world powers, whether codified or implicit, is essential since it secures legitimacy and credibility abroad. Richard Haas explains the importance of a commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation in the 21st when he asserts, “Rules of the road are just as necessary in the contemporary era. What is needed though, are not simply ‘negative’ understandings among the major powers that constrain competition, but ‘positive’ commitments about how to work together to meet pressing challenges” (19). Common interests and objectives can be achieved within the broader framework of international organizations and economic arrangements such as, the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Neo-realists abrade the effectiveness of international organizations, believing that they are idealistic and infringe on national sovereignty. In an international system that is inherently competitive, man as well as states pursue self-interests above the collective good. The pursuit of self-interest is theoretically invoked by Rousseau’s allegory of the stag hunt, depicting the dilemma between safety and social cooperation (Waltz, notes). In light of this assumption realists conceive security as a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made. Neo-realists believe the international system is one of “high risk.” “In the absence of a supreme authority,”

Waltz argues, “there is the constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force” (qtd. in Brooks 447). The unequivocal “possibility of conflict” causes neo-realists to adopt a “worse-case scenario” perspective that favors short-term military preparedness over long-term political and economic objectives. The biggest weakness of their argument is that their decision-making is canalized by perceived intentions and not empirical guidelines (Brooks 447-448).

In a world of increasing economic interdependence, globalization, and a preponderant international consensus based on peace, democracy, and a free market economy, the propensity to challenge the status quo is diminished. Haas makes a valid point that integration achieved through a framework of shared principles is the natural successor to containment...” (Haas 24). The process of integration diminishes a country’s pursuit of personal interests. Although international organizations such as the European Union and NATO infringe on sovereignty because of the trade-offs involved in entering a collective group, it has not had any negative effects. There have been no wars amongst EU or NATO countries in the past 50 years, and the two organizations have led to peace amongst its participants. NATO’s collective security agreement was tempered after Al Qaeda attacked the United States on 9/11. For the first time in history NATO members invoked Article Five vindicating that an attack against one is an attack against all.

In *The Good Fight*, Peter Beinart articulates the policy of international cooperation and burden sharing in his vision for a “New Liberalism.” He states:

Liberalism’s answer is the same one it gave at the Willard Hotel: shared struggle based upon shared power and shared risk. Abroad, America shares power because we recognize our limits,

both practical and moral. And we see that recognition not as a sign of weakness, but of strength. (207)

Beinart’s statement functions on two important levels. First it expresses the belief in absolute gains over a zero-sum game, meaning that through cooperation all constituencies mutually benefit. Secondly it addresses the significance of cost-benefit analysis. Although a primacy strategy may protect security interests better in the short run, projecting power further from our shores eventually leads to a decline in a country’s real power.

b. Hamiltonianism and a Liberal Economic Foundation

The pursuit of collective security coincides with economic capacity. An important component of United States grand strategy is to ensure that world markets and the free enterprise economic order are favorable to United States commercial interests. In *Special Providence*, Walter Russell Mead articulates the importance of trade and commerce vis-à-vis the Hamiltonian foreign policy tradition. From a classical liberal perspective, cooperation in the global economy, trade based on comparative advantage, and international divisions of labor are key elements to domestic stability and peace abroad (Kapstein 5-6). Economics is arguably the embryo of foreign policy, in the dual meaning that it constitutes both the beginning and center of foreign policy. A case in point, the first U.S. treaty was signed with Morocco on 16 July 1786 in order to protect U.S. trade and commerce against the Barbary pirates (“The Avalon Project”). Even during isolationist periods the United States was tied to international affairs economically through the world market and foreign investment.

In the international political economy, economic power precedes the projection of military power. The ascendancy of

American hegemony in twentieth century occurred at the end of World War II when the dollar replaced the pound as the base of international currency. Now, United States currency has the greatest intrinsic value, and we spend more than the first twelve countries in the world combined on defense spending. In fact, the excessive spending of the current administration can be characterized by what Walter Lippmann has labeled as “deficit diplomacy,” “a case where international economic commitments exceed the public’s willingness to bear the requisite burdens” (qtd. in Kupchan and Trubowitz 2).

The precarious tension between military and domestic spending is reflected in the guns versus butter debate. It is widely known that if you spend too much on the military component, your economy will fail. A case in point, Russia was a military superpower for 40 years. Now they are economically a third world country. In contrast, some believe China will be an economic superpower in the next 15-20 years. Their percentage of GDP spent on the military is relatively limited, but purposeful. The tension between civilian and military spending reveals the importance of maintaining a fiscally restrained economic policy and a balanced budget. One specific solution to curtail excessive defense spending in the next ten years would be to cut defense spending by 30% and use compound interest to strengthen the national economy.

In *Special Providence*, Mead insinuates that Hamiltonians and Wilsonians are natural complements, and the two schools dovetail since Wilsonian ideals concur with democratic capitalism. According to political-economic theory, the movement toward free trade is analogous to the movement toward democracy because democracy opened up new venues for achieving support for free trade. For example, the vote and universal suffrage are

major components of this transformation because it enfranchises the majority constituency who benefit from free trade. A political candidate is compelled to appeal to the majority interest in order to be elected whereas in autocracies the leader generally appeals to the smaller, powerful minority. Free trade is simultaneously reinforced by the spread of neo-liberal policy, the belief in a free market, and global welfare maximization (Milner and Kubota 108, 112, 115). There is no conclusive evidence in literature that provides a consensus direction of causality between economic and political liberalization. Although history favors economic liberalization giving way to political liberalization, we are largely limited by anecdotal evidence. For example, Chile under the Pinochet dictatorship during the 1980s and South East Asian countries such as Singapore and South Korea illustrate economic liberalization preceding political liberalization whereas in the case of Russia, democratization prompted economic liberalization.

Beinart considers geo-economics to be commensurate with geo-politics. The economic underpinnings of neo-liberalism were created from the liberal economic order after World War II. It had three essential tenets: 1) a commitment to open world economy, 2) multi-world management of the economy, and 3) stabilization of socio-economic welfare. Beinart argues that these principles are applicable today. Economic openness was the most basic lesson of World War II following the economic dislocation of the Great Depression. It was evident that closed economic regimes contributed to the division of the world into trading blocs. This was punctuated by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 and the Ottawa System of Trading in the United Kingdom. The end of economic openness became a harbinger for war.

The international system recovered from depression through joint management

of the international economy facilitated by the creation of Bretton-Woods system, World Bank, and GATT. Thus, the neo-liberal outlook in U.S. foreign policy focused on using its position as a dominant power to create institutional networks that were a reflection of our core principles. The idea of stabilization through socio-economic welfare is manifested in the legacy of the Marshall Plan. In the 21st century, terrorism feeds off of economic underdevelopment. Providing regional economic stability and aid is one strategy option to confront the “War on Terror” (Hentz, “Lecture”).

c. Nexus of Domestic and International Politics

Achieving domestic equilibrium in the United States that is capable of articulating an accepted and politically solvent foreign policy is one of the preeminent challenges for U.S. leadership. In the article, “Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining,” Andrew Moravesik examines Robert Putnam’s concept of “two-level game” theory and the connections between domestic and international politics. The issue of integrating domestic and foreign policy emerges as a dominant theme in *The Good Fight*. There were two essential reasons for the waning of the Democratic Party. First, the party’s policy had a tendency to define itself by its counterpart, the Republican Party, and therefore failed to articulate a unique and creative vision for America. Secondly, liberals questioned the belief in American exceptionalism. For these two reasons, the Democratic Party was accused of “losing faith” in the country’s past and tradition causing them to lose populist appeal.

One way to reconcile the liberal-conservative divide is to consider the tone of foreign policy, consistency between rhetoric and action, and adherence to morality and virtue. Presently the liberal and conservative narratives are expressed in

absolute terms: conservatives proselytize the moral goodness of America- *we can do no wrong* and liberals articulate the opposite- *we can do no right*. By integrating the two mantras a new vision can be expressed through the lens of moral relativism. Reinhold Niebuhr, a 20th century Protestant theologian, articulates the concept of moral relativism particularly well. He writes:

We must take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous actions to preserve our civilization. We must exercise our power. But we ought neither to believe that a nation is capable of perfect disinterestedness in its exercise, nor become complacent about particular degrees of interest and passion which corrupt the justice by which the exercise of power is legitimized. (qtd. in Beinart 130)

Niebuhr suggests that we should be secure in our own virtue and exhibit humility in our actions. Humility requires that we continually challenge our conceptions of right and wrong. Ultimately, an agreement in virtue and its process translates to why we should cooperate with others though a policy of multilateralism.

CHALLENGES, THREATS, AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

a. State Building

In, chapter two “International Security,” Mandelbaum addresses the issue of state building as “establishing the apparatus of working, effective, and decent government” in order to facilitate long-term stability. The dynamics of state-building is a conundrum the United States is currently confronting in the post-war stabilization of Iraq and which has achieved limited degrees of success in previous instances; cases in point, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq during the first Gulf War.

Mandelbaum discusses a number of reasons for contemporary U.S. failures in nation-building. Some of his points include the inability of the United States to employ force in fear of being labeled as an imperialist power, the forces of nationalism and the desire of groups to govern themselves, and the loss of public stamina caused by economic, political, and psychological adversity. Given the constraints that Mandelbaum identifies, how can the United States develop a more coherent and effective strategy for restoring post-war order and establishing the necessary institutions to ensure prolonged peace?

I believe that a resolution requires a multifaceted approach that integrates three principal components. First, each situation needs to be assessed individually. I am critical of those proponents who apply the Marshall Plan as mantra. Applying historical analogies is acceptable so long as one recognizes the contradictory evidence. Secondly, state-building must garner multilateral commitment. The success of reconstruction in post-war Europe was achieved by a concert of nations and accordingly a positive factor of the Marshall Plan. Lastly the praxis of state-building must be economic development. A Hamiltonian approach argues that economic interdependence will provide security and political liberalization will follow economic liberalization.

Since state-building is a complex problem, it therefore compels a complex and dynamic approach. Can the legacy of the Marshall Plan be applied to Iraq? To some degree, yes, but it must be adapted to fit the political and economic context of the Middle East. I think Mark Twain articulated it best in respect to the application of historical analogy: "History does not repeat itself, it rhymes." Therefore in applying the lessons of the Marshall Plan and reconstruction in general, it is necessary to incorporate multiple analogies and examine the

contradictory evidence. For example, the Marshall Plan applied to the Middle East would be exceedingly expensive since there is no base economy. Europe on the other hand provided 75% indigenous investment, and it facilitated reconstruction with a dense network of trade relations. Africa and the Middle East have no significant functioning trade organizations and a weak regional identity. Although the Middle East is tribal, there is stronger centralized control that could be exploited. Additionally Iraq can use its oil assets and proceeds to facilitate economic growth.

A positive factor of the Marshall Plan legacy was that it gave "generosity without hubris" (Beinart 123). In the Middle East our economic assistance has been overwhelmingly insufficient, and we dictate the terms with moral superiority. In order to overcome dissent reflected by nationalism and the desire for sovereignty, the premise of economic reconstruction must be one of compromise. The Middle East should be involved in designing their own program and take ownership of it. Universally, a people will not protect and defend something if it is not their own and they are not proud of it. Any program pursued should unite the countries and factions in a common purpose and goal.

In a post-Cold War order where imperialism is no longer deemed acceptable, state-building must seek multilateral commitment to ensure international legitimacy. Such commitment entails support from multiple nations and international consensus from organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, and the IMF. In an article written prior to the War in Iraq debating the legitimacy of United States intervention, Will Leahy underscores the importance of multilateralism giving foresight to post-war reconstruction efforts. He asserts:

Otherwise, the United States runs the risk of being perceived in the region and throughout the world as a “neo-imperialist” power, a scenario which would inevitably engender increased animosity towards the United States and strike a great blow to our nation’s already waning diplomatic legitimacy abroad.

Leahy’s statement complements the ideas of Kupchan on a pragmatic sense and Niebur on incorporating a moral outlook. Mandelbaum argues that of its policies, the United States probably exerts the most influence and power by providing an example of a stable, democratic order. By pursuing that which is perceived as an imperialist tendency and exploiting undemocratic methods to achieve our goals, it deteriorates our image and principles of democracy. Through multilateral and international consensus the United States can hedge against anti-American sentiments.

Lastly, the organizing principle of state-building must be economic policy. This idea is consistent with Mandelbaum’s views:

To work effectively, free markets require what state-building is intended to create: institutions, in particular the financial structures at the heart of a market economy and the governmental institutions necessary to secure property rights and enforce contracts. Moreover, working free markets tend, once established, to promote the democratic politics that promise to alleviate the security problems for which the United States has assumed responsibility in the twenty-first century. (86)

The argument supporting nation building is reinforced by Mandelbaum’s application of the post-World War II global consensus. He notes that there are three conditions of the new global consensus: peace, democracy, and

free market economy. Of those conditions, free market economy has the most expansive penetrations and supports the other two. The Hamiltonian and neo-liberal economic argument for state-building is based on the assumption that economic development precedes political development. For example, in the Middle East, terrorism feeds on economic despair and generates its political base by providing basic services to gain supporters. A commitment to economic and welfare stabilization represents one strategy for ameliorating the threat of terrorism.

In *The Good Fight*, Beinart argues that Bush ignored the geopolitical panorama of the post Cold War era, and he is only focused on high politics and ideology. A neo-liberal outlook endeavors to use our dominant position to create networks and the sinews of institution that will outlive our dominance. These institutions are a reflection of our core principles and power to shape agreements and long-term vision. For Beinart, liberty matters, but economic development is more important. A weakness in Bush’s strategy was that he promoted Islamic democracy over Islamic development. Beinart provides two examples of this inadequacy, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Millennium Challenge Account of 2002. Both of these programs promised economic aid and development, but never gave a sufficient amount or funding was cut (Beinart 121). In the Middle East, economic reconstruction could be generated from oil revenues and coupled with multilateral and international support.

b. Placating Anti-Americanism through Transatlantic Alliance

Doug Bandow’s essay, “American Strategy after September 11: On Intervention and Republican Principles,” advocates the position of neo-isolationism in grand strategy using primacy as his straw man. His strategy reflects two fundamental

objectives that are consistent with Jeffersonian thinking. First he believes that the United States should stay clear of entangling affairs, an anti-balance of power approach. Second, he believes our foremost goal should be the protection of American citizens and the preservation of liberty. He posits that our large military force, deficit defense spending, and our projection of power abroad is perceived as a threat and becomes a catalyst for anti-Americanism and terrorist attacks. Additionally, he makes three insightful comments that indirectly point to a larger theme- the nature of United States global leadership. He states:

- By making the world's conflicts America's own, Washington is increasing the risk of war for the United States. (22)
- Terrorism is largely a response to US government activism..." (22)
- "...a policy of realism must take into account the unintended consequences of promiscuous intervention on behalf of primacy. Even nations that view the United States as a benign power and support many of its policies do not want to be subject to America's dictates. The very attempt to maintain primacy will increase efforts by other nations to end it. (23)

Expanding on Bandow's proposition of neo-isolationism, I feel that at the core of redefining the context of United States global leadership is a synthesis of neo-isolationism and cooperative security.

In the article "Coalition of the Waiting" by Jonathan Rauch recognizes a disparity between political and populist interests. Polls from the Pew Global Attitudes Project show that the proportion of Europeans who view US leadership in world affairs as desirable has significantly declined from 64 percent to 37 percent since 2002; however, he also articulates that in contrast to the polls, anti-US sentiment did

not correlate to anti-US politics, case in point Angela Merkel of Germany, Tony Blair, and Nicolas Sarkozy, interior minister of France. All three of these individuals are eager to enhance US-European cooperation and transatlantic relations. As Jonathan Rauch argues, in this instance realism has prevailed and political interests trump issues of popularity (29-31).

Rauch's argument is important because it reveals a European environment that is open and responsive to cooperation and burden sharing. Albeit the opportunity to strengthen the transatlantic alliance, imagine the success that could be achieved by incorporating both elements: global consensus and popularity; however, I believe that to achieve these two elements requires the United States to redefine their ethos and role in the global community in a way that values a spirit of humanity, cooperation, dignity, and humility. Historical data has revealed a strong correlation between US intervention and involvement in international affairs to an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. If the great powers acted in cooperation and consensus, would the threat of terrorism be as prevalent? Terrorists would no longer be attacking a single country, but a more powerful majority archetype and idea. If Bandow's assumption is correct, and that antagonism from other state and non-state actors is a result of an intrusive and abrasive approach in international affairs, then it can be reduced by seeking collective action, multilateralism, and majority consensus.

A less abrasive global leadership approach would adhere to the following principles. First, the United States would only intervene in international affairs if something threatened our vital national interests and if the global community acknowledged the threat. This would also mean that the United States should scale back on defense spending, yet still be prepared for rapid mobilization. In terms

of the War on Terror, the United States should confront the threat, terrorism, directly, and follow a threat-based response as opposed to democratization of the Middle East. Such a policy would rely on intelligence and area denial.

CONCLUSION

In *The Opportunity*, Haas lists two fundamental realities of the 21st century. First, "Isolation is an anachronism in the global era," and second, "...there is virtually nothing the United States can do better without others" (Haas 199). In a post 11/9 and 9/11 world, the first event denoting the fall of the Berlin Wall and a symbol of global openness, and the second signifying the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and western Pennsylvania, the Jeffersonian model of isolation is no longer a viable option. A classical liberal vision to national security based on partnership, fiscal responsibility, economic development and welfare stabilization is vital to achieving long-term goals of domestic security and national posterity. Lastly, a tone of dignity and humility, consistency between rhetoric and actions, and an affirmation of morality and virtue are paramount to engendering legitimacy abroad and cooperation in international affairs.

NOTES

¹ Malta and Cyprus adopted the Euro on 1 Jan 2008. Slovakia will adopt the Euro 1 Jan 2009.

² According to the World Economic Outlook.

³ The term, "rapid state of transition" is attributed by Boutros-Boutros Ghali.

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